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CASE COMMENTS

PRODUCTS LIABILITY -

PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF -

A

NEW LEGAL THEORY, OBVIATING THE NECESSITY TO IDENTIFY THE
MANUFACTURER OF AN INJURY-CAUSING PRODUCT, IS ADOPTED IN A
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIM AGAINST MANUFACTURERS OF

DES

The plaintiff' alleged that she had received personal injuries,
in the nature of precancerous and cancerous tumors and lesions,
from prenatal exposure to the drug diethylstilbesterol 2 (DES). 3 The
drug was allegedly administered to plaintiff's mother as a
miscarriage preventive. 4 Because of the time lapse between the
intake of the DES and the manifestations of alleged injuries, 5 the
plaintiff could not identify the manufacturer of the drug ingested by
her mother. 6 The plaintiff, therefore, sought to hold a number of
the major manufacturers7 of the fungible drug8 jointly liable for her
1. The present case is a consolidation of two seperate class action suits. Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 597, 607 P.2d 924, 927, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 135, cert. denied,
U.S.
-,
101 S. Ct. 285 (1980). Each action was brought on behalf of an individual plaintiff and
on behalf of other women similarly situated. "Plaintiff' in this discussion, as it did in the court's
opinion, refers to plaintiffJudith Sindell and her claim. Id. at 593, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
133.
2. Diethylstilbesterol (DES) is a synthetic female sex hormone which may be dispensed only
when prescribed by a physician. FACTS AND COMPARISONS 96-98, 101(a) (E. Kastrup ed. 1980). For a
collection of recent cases involvingDES manufacturers, see Annot., 2 A.L.R. 4th 1091 (1980).
3. 26 Cal. 3d at 595-96, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Plaintiff alleged that, as a result
of the DES ingested by her mother, she developed a malignant bladder tumor which was removed by
surgery. She further alleged that she suffers from adenosis, which must be constantly monitored by
biopsy to insure early warning of further malignancy. Id.
4. Id. at 593, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133. DES was approved by the Food and Drug
Administration in 1947 for preventing miscarriages" and was used until 1971, when maternal
administration was banned because of its dangers and ineffectiveness. See Herbst, Scully & Robboy,
Effects ofMaternalDES Ingestion on the Female Genital Tracts, HOSPITAL PRACTICE, Oct. 1975, at 51.
5. 26 Cal. 3d at 594, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133. The plaintiff alleged a minimum
latent period often to twelve years. Id.
6. Id. at 601, 607 P.2d at 930, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138. The court held that the impossibility of
identification resulted primarily from the passage of time and the manner in which the plaintiff was
allegedly injured. It was not the fault of the plaintiff, nor was it directly attributable to any negligent
act of the defendants. Id. For a further discussion of this identification problem, see infra notes 24-30
and accompanying text.
7. 26 Cal. 3d at 596, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. The appeal to the California
Supreme Court involved five defendant manufacturers of DES. Id. The defendant manufacturers
alleged that approximately two hundred drug companies made DES, any of which might have
manufactured the injury-producing drug. Id. at 602, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139. The
plaintiff alleged, however, that five or six of these companies produced ninety percent of the DES
marketed. Id. at 612,607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
8. Id. at 605, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141. The Sindell court noted that "ftlhe formula

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

injuries. 9 The Supreme Court of California held that the plaintiff
would have a cause of action against the DES manufacturers if she
could establish that the named manufacturers together produced a
substantial percentage of the DES marketed for the prevention of
miscarriages, 10 and each manufacturer would be held liable for the
portion of the judgment represented by its share of the market for
the drug unless it demonstrated that it could not have made the
product which caused plaintiffs injuries.1 1 Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories,26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert.
denied, - U.S. - , 101 S.Ct. 285 (1980).
DES, a female sex hormone, 12 was prescribed to millions of
pregnant women from the 1940s through the 1960s as a miscarriage
preventive.1 " In 1971, maternal administration of DES was banned
by the Food and Drug Administration because of its questionable
effectiveness and its propensity to cause gynecological anomalies in
female offspring who were prenately exposed to it. 14 DES daughters
seeking to recover damages from pharmaceutical manufacturers for
their injuries however, 15 faced a unique evidentiary burden in
for DES is a scientific constant. It is set forth in the United States Pharmacopoeia, and any manufacturer
producing that drug must, with exceptions not relevant here, utilize the formula set forth in that
compendium." Id. (citing 21 U.S.C.A. S 351(b)).
9. 26 Cal. 3d at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136. The plaintiff sought to hold the
defendants liable for her injuries based upon three theories of joint liability: alternative liability,
concert of action, and industry-wide liability. Id. For a discussion of these theories and their
application to DES cases, see infra notes 32-55 and accompanying text.
10. 26 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The court stated:
[Wie hold it to be reasonable in the present context to measure the likelihood that any
of the defendants supplied the product which allegedly injured plaintiff by the
percentage which the DES sold by each of them for the purpose of preventing
miscarriage bears to the entire production of the drug sold by all for that purpose.
Id.
11. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The court created a new basis for joint
liability to enable the plaintiff
text. to more easily establish causation by a named defendant. See infra notes
58-62 and accompanying
The United States Supreme Court declined to review. the Sindell decision. E.R. Squib & Sons v.
-,
101 S. Ct. 285 (1980). The drug manufacturers argued in their
U.S.
Sindell,
petitions for review before the Supreme Court that the California decision violated their right to due
process, because the resultant shifting of the burden of proof created an "irrational and arbitrary"
presumption of causation. [19801 8 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 743. They also argued that
the ruling represented a denial of equal protection and violated the supremacy clause of the
Constitution by frustrating federal policies governing the development and marketing of prescription
drugs. Id. at 608-09.
12. FACTS AND COMPARISONS, supra note 2, at 101(a).
13. 26 Cal. 3d at 597, 607 P.2d at 927, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (citing Comment, DES and a
Proposed Theory of EnterpriseLiability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 964-67 (1978)). The court noted that
"estimates of the number of women who took the drug during pregnancy range from 1 4 million to
3 million. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of the daughters of these women suffer from
adenocarcinoma, and the incidence of vaginal adenosis among them is 30 to 90 percent." 26 Cal. 3d
at 597, 607 P.2d at 927, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
14. See Herbst, Scully & Robboy, supra note 4, at 51.
15. FACTS AND COMPARISONS, supra note 2, at 96. The use of female sex hormones during
pregnancy may seriously damage the offspring:
It has been shown that females exposed in utero to diethylstilbesterol, a non-steroidal
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attempting to establish causation under traditional tort standards.1 6
Causation is an essential element in any action in tort, 7 and
the burden is on the plaintiff to establish it."8 The plaintiff must
first establish causation-in-fact,1 9 requiring proof that the
defendant's conduct was a "material element and substantial
factor" in bringing about the plaintiff's injury. 20 The plaintiff must
further establish proximate or legal causation,2 1 requiring proof
that the defendant had a legal duty to protect the plaintiff from the
22
resulting injury.
The unique evidentiary problem confronting DES plaintiffs is
the difficulty they have in establishing one of the elements of
causation-in-fact. To establish causation-in-fact in a products
liability action, the plaintiff must show: (1) that the product
involved was defective; (2) that the defect caused the injury
complained of; and (3) that the defect can be traced to the
defendant. 23 Many DES plaintiffs, however, cannot identify the
manufacturer of the DES ingested by their mothers. 24 The sheer
25
number of potential manufacturers makes identification difficult.
It has been estimated that as many as three hundred manufacturers
were producing the drug from an identical formula during the
1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. 26 Additionally, the manner in which DES
plaintiffs were allegedly injured inhibits identification. 27 There is a
estrogen, have an increased risk of developing in later life a form of vaginal or cervical
cancer that is ordinarily extremely rare. This risk has been estimated at no greater
than 4 per 1000 exposures. Furthermore, a high percentage of such exposed women
(from 30 to 90%) have been found to have vaginal adenosis, epithelial changes of the
vagina and cervix. Although these changes are historically benign, it is not known
whether they are precursors of malignancy.
Id.
16. See 26 Cal. 3d at 593,607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
17. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 236 (4th ed. 1971). "An essential element of the
plaintiff's cause of action for negligence, or for that matter for any other tort, is that there be some
reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the
plaintiffhas suffered." Id.
18. Id. at 241. The plaintiff, in general, has the burden of proof on all issues essential to his
cause of action. Id.
19. Id. at 237.
20. Id. at 240.
21. Id. § 42, at 244. "Once it is established that the defendant's conduct has in fact been one of
the causes of the plaintiff's injury, there remains the question whether the defendant should be
legally responsible for what he has caused." Id. (footnote omitted).
22. Id.
23. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 5 16A(4), at 3B-88 (1980).
24. 26 Cal. 3d at 597, 607 P.2d at 927-28, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135-36. The Sindell court, as did the
trial court, accepted at face value plaintiff's assertion that she could not make identification. Id. at
600 n.12, 607 P.2d at930 n.12, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138 n.12.
25. Id. at 602-03, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139. The defendants in Sindell alleged that
there were approximately two hundred drug companies which made DES, any of which might have
manufactured the injury-causing drug. Id. However, many of these manufacturers may no longer
be in business or they may not be subject to thejurisdiction of a particular court. Id. at 610, 607 P.2d
at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
26. Comment, DES anda Proposed Theory ofEnterpriseLiabii'y, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 964 n.3
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Fordham Comment].
27. 26 Cal. 3d at 600, 607 P.2d at 929, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
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minimum latent period of ten to fifteen years between in utero
exposure and manifestation of the injury. 28 Because of this time
lapse, many of the pharmaceutical and medical records have often
been lost or destroyed. 29 Thus, no definite evidence is available to
connect a particular manufacturer to the DES it produced. 0
DES plaintiffs have sought to obviate the necessity to identify a
precise manufacturer by advancing various theories of joint
liability. 3 One theory which has been suggested is "concert of
action,' '32 which provides that all actors who by express agreement
or tacit understanding engage in tortious activity are jointly and
severally liable for the injuries produced. 33 A typical application of
concerted action to impose liability upon multiple defendants
occurs when a bystander is hit by one of the participants in a drag
race. 34 Although only one participant directly causes the
bystander's injuries, liability, is imposed upon all members of the
28. See Herbst, Scully & Robboy, Problems in the Examination of the DES-Exposed Female, 46
& GYNECOLOGY 353, 354 (1975).
29 26 Cal. 3d at 600,607 P.2d at 929, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
30. SeeGray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (DES plaintiff's claim
dismissed because of her inability to provide any proof establishing the particular manufacturer of
the injury-causing drug). The physician or pharmacist selects the manufacturer of a drug dispensed
by prescription without consulting the patient. They in turn are in control of the only means
available to identify the manufacturer: their records. If these records are destroyed, the patient
generally will not be able to identify the product dispensed to them. Id.
31. Compare Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr.
at 136 (identifying precise manufacturer of drug which harmed plaintiff not required) with McCreery
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 85, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730, 735 (1978) (plaintiff's claim failed
because of inability to identify precise manufacturer; overruled by implication in Sindell). See also
Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59,
_
289 N.W.2d 20, 24 (1979); Lyons v. Premo
Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 183, __,
406 A.2d 185, 189-90, cert. denied, 82 N.J.
267, 412 A.2d 774 (1979).
Joint liability may arise in many instances in tort law. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 17, 5
52, at 314-17 (listing a number of the more common situations). DES plaintiffs have suggested three
classifications ofjoint liability upon which multiple defendants could be held liable for their injuries:
alternative liability, industry-wide liability, and concerted action. 26 Cal. 3d at 598, 607 P.2d at 928,
163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
32. 26 Cal. 3d at 603, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139. The elements of the doctrine of
concert of action are as follows:

OBSTETRICS

For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is
subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a
common design with him, or (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct
himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious
result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the
third person.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 876 (1979).
33. W. PROSSER, supra note 17, S 46, at 292.

Although an express agreement is not necessary,
something more than mere knowledge by each party of the other's conduct is needed to establish
concert of action. Furthermore, it is essential that each defendant be proceeding tortiously, with
intent to commit a tort or with negligence. Id.
34. Agovino v. Kunzl, 181 Cal. App. 2d 591, 5 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1960). The plaintiff sought to
recover for injuries sustained in a collision between a vehicle in which he was riding and an
automobile being driven by a third party. Plaintiff alleged that defendant was engaged in a drag race
with the third party at the time the collision occurred. Id. at __
, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 535. The court
held that defendant and the third party were jointly engaged in a series of acts which led directly to
the collision, and they therefore were jointly and severally liable. Id. at __
, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
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joint enterprise. 35 The act of one is the act of all. 36 Each participant
who willfully gave substantial assistance and encouragement to the
cause-in-fact wrongdoer is jointly and severally liable for injuries
produced.3 7 DES plaintiffs have attempted to utilize this theory by
alleging that their injuries were caused by the concerted tortious
38
acts of various pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Another proposed basis for liability is the concept of
"industry-wide liability" suggested in Hall v. E.L DuPont de
Nemours. 39 The plaintiff in Hall sought to hold six blasting cap
manufacturers jointly liable because he could not identify the
supplier of the cap which exploded and injured him.4 0 The court
found a valid claim in the plaintiff's allegation that there was
industry-wide cooperation in the manufacture and design of
blasting caps which resulted in inadequate industry-wide safety
standards.4 1 Furthermore, upon establishment of joint control of
risk, the court held that the burden of proving who actually caused
the injury would shift to the joined defendants if the plaintiff could
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the injuryproducing cap was manufactured by any one of the defendants. 42
DES plaintiffs have unsuccessfully attempted to use the Hall
rationale by alleging that the pharmaceutical manufacturers
adhered to an industry-wide safety standard and collaborated in the
43
marketing of DES.
, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
35. Id. at__
36. W. PROSSER, supra note 17, S 46, at 292.
37. Id.
38. 26 Cal. 3d at 604-05, 607 P.2d at 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140. The plaintiffin Sindell alleged a
tacit understanding among defendants to commit a tortious act. She alleged express and implied
agreements, collaboration in, reliance upon, acquiescence in, ratification, exploitation, and adoption
of each other's testing, marketing methods, and lack ofwarnings. Id.
39. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
40. Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 345 F. Supp. 353, 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The plaintiffs
were seeking to recover for injuries to children caused by the explosion of dynamite blasting caps. Id.
Theevidence of the individual manufacturer's identity was destroyed by the explosions. Id. at 378.
41. Id. at 372-78. The court noted that "joint control of risk can exist among actors who are not
bound in a profit-sharing joint venture." Id. at 373. The court further held that, "ftlo establish that
the explosives industry should be held jointly liable on enterprise liability grounds, plaintiffs,
pursuant to their pleading, will have to demonstrate defendants' joint awareness of the risks at issue
in this case and theirjoint capacity to reduce or affect those risks." Id. at 378.
42. Id. at 380. The court stated:
If plaintiffs can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury-causing
caps were the product of some unknown one of the named defendants, that each
named defendant breached a duty of care owed to plaintiffs and that these breaches
were substantially concurrent in time and of similar nature, they will be entitled to a
shift of the burden of proof on the issue of causation.
Id.
43. 26 Cal. 3d at 608, 607 P.2d at 934, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 142. The court noted that plaintiff
alleged "joint enterprise and collaboration among defendants in the production, marketing,
promotion, and testing of DES, and 'concerted promulgation and adherence to industry-wide
testing, safety, warning and efficiency standards' for the drug." Id.
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The third theory which has been proposed to alleviate the DES
plaintiff's identification problem is alternative liability. 44 Under
this principle, the plaintiffs burden of proving causation is
46
relaxed. 4 5 Alternative liability was first adopted in Summers v. Tice,
in which the plaintiff was injured when two companion hunters
simultaneously and negligently shot in his direction. 4 7 Only one
shot struck the plaintiff, but it was impossible to determine which of
the two hunters had fired the injury-causing shot. 48 The court held
that it would be unfair to allow independently acting wrongdoers to
escape liability when they had created a situation in which an
49
innocent plaintiff could not identify the cause of his injury.
Therefore, the burden of proof was shifted to the defendants, each
to absolve himself if he could; 50 if not, each would be jointly and
severally liable, whether they were acting in concert or
independently. 51 Because alternative liability shifts the burden of
proving causation to a named defendant, DES plaintiffs have
attempted to use the theory by alleging that all DES manufacturers
behaved tortiously, making it impossible to determine which
52
manufacturer's product caused their injuries.
Attempts by DES plaintiffs to solve their problem of proving
Hall has been described as a variation of concerted action - joint liability. Fordham Comment,
supra note 26, at 981. A more accurate description, however, which might explain its limitations,
would be joint and several liability resulting not from a common design, but from the independent
tortious actions of two or more defendants which concur in producing a single indivisible result. The
Hall court expressly limited its theory ofjoint liability to industries composed of a small number of
units: "What would be fair and feasible with regard to an industry of five or ten producers might be
manifestly unreasonable if applied to a decentralized industry composed of thousands of small
producers." 345 F. Supp. at 378. The court further required that the plaintiffs establish "that each
named defendant breached a duty of care owed to plaintiffs and that these breaches were
substantially concurrent in time and of similar nature" in order to be entitled to a shift of the burden
of proof. Id. at 380.
For a discussion of industry-wide liability and its applicability to actions alleging injuries from
DES, see Fordham Comment, supra note 26, at 995-1007. But see Note, Industry-wide Liability, 13
SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 980, 997-1022 (1979) (discussing industry-wide liability as an unnecessary
expansion of products liability law). The Sindell court expressly rejected the industry-wide theory of
liability proposed in the Fordham Comment. 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 B(3) (1965). This section provides:
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has
been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which
one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused
the harm.
Id.
45. Id.
46. 33 Cal. 2d80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
47. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 84, 199 P.2d 1, 2 (1948).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 86, 199 P.2d at 4.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 87, 199 P.2d at 5. The doctrines of alternative liability and res ipsa loquiter have also
been used together to impose joint and several liability when the evidence does not establish that
all defendants behaved tortiously. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 490-91, 154 P.2d 687, 689
(1944).
52. 26 Cal. 3d at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
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causation have been largely unsuccessful, 53 due to the complexity of
the pharmaceutical industry. The doctrines of concerted action,
industry-wide liability, and alternative liability have usually been
applied only in simple tort situations in which there is a reasonable
connection between the defendants' acts or omissions 54 and the
plaintiff's injury. 55 The complex factual circumstances of the DES
cases, however, make proof of this causal link, under traditional
tort principles, 56 difficult if not impossible.57
In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, the court created a new theory
of joint liability to enable DES plaintiffs to more easily establish
causation by a named defendant.5 8 Its holding was based upon an
extension of the alternative liability doctrine of Summers v. Tice. 5 9
53. Id. at 597, 607 P.2d at 927-28, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135-36.
54. Causatiorn requires that there be "some reasonable connection between the act or omission
of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered." W. PROSSER, supra note 17, S 41,
at 236.
55. Under the doctrine of concerted action there must be either an express agreement or tacit
understanding to willfully engage in a common design. 26 Cal. 3d at 604, 607 P.2d at 932, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 140. However, common industrial marketing procedures do not necessarily constitute
concerted tortious activity. DES plaintiffs have therefore generally failed in their attempts to
establish joint liability under the doctrine of concerted action, because their complaints allege no
more than parallel or imitative conduct, which does not constitute concerted tortious action. Id. at
605, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141; accord, Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 170
N.J. Super. 183,
-,
406 A.2d 185, 190-91, cert. denied, 82 N.J. 267, 412 A.2d 774 (1979). Butcf.
Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59,
-,
289 N.W.2d 20, 25 (1979) (summary judgment
improper, plaintiffs mere allegations of concerted action were sufficient to state a cause of action);
Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., A.D.2d -, N.Y.S.2d __
(1981) (court upheldjury verdict
for plaintiff, finding there was ample evidence from which a jury could determine that the defendantmanufacturer was engaged in concerted action).
The doctrine of industry-wide liability formulated by the Hall court was expressly limited to
industries involving a small number of manufacturers. 345 F. Supp. at 378. In Sindell, over two
hundred manufacturers were involved, and many of the safety regulations in the drug industry are
promulgated by the Food and Drug Administration. 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 143. Consequently, attempts by DES plaintiffs to use the doctrine of industry-wide liability
have also failed. Id. at 609-10, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143; accord, Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
94 Mich. App. at __,
289 N.W.2d at 27.
In Summers, both defendants had been negligent toward the plaintiff, and all parties who were or
could have been responsible for the harm to the plaintiff were joined in the action. 33 Cal. 2d at 86,
199 P.2d at 4. In the DES cases, however, it generally cannot be shown that the allegedly tortious
activity of each manufacturer was directed at the plaintiff and that all potentially responsible parties
are joined. 26 Cal. 3d at 602, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139. Therefore, alternative liability
claims by DES plaintiffs have generally been rejected. Id. In Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., the court upheld
the DES plaintiffs alternative liability claim. 94 Mich. App. at __
, 289 N.W.2d at 26. The
plaintiff had alleged in her .complaint that the named defendants constituted all the known
manufacturers of DES whose products were distributed in Michigan during the relevant period of
time. Id. at ___,
289 N.W.2d at 22.
56. See Wetzel v. Eaton Corp., 62 F.R.D. 22, 29-30 (D. Minn. 1973) (court notes that it is
essential in a products liability action against the alleged manufacturer or seller that plaintiff identify
the defendant as either the manufacturer or seller of the product). See also Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 1344,
1351 (1973) (general rule that defendant must be identified as manufacturer or seller).
57. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
58. 26 Cal. 3d at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
59. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. The Sindell court found that a
modification of the rule in Summers was warranted in this instance. Id.
A New Jersey trial court also recently held that the alternative liability theory was appropriate
for DES cases. Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119801 8 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 795 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1980). The court did not follow the Sindell decision, but applied the precedent established
in Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1 (1975). In Anderson, an action was brought against
a surgeon, a hospital, a manufacturer of a surgical instrument, and the supplier of the instrument for
injuries sustained during the course of a surgical operation when the tip of a forceps broke off and
lodged in the patient's spinal canal. Id. at __
, 338 A.2d at 3. The Supreme Court of New Jersey
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The court recognized that the drug was produced by all
manufacturers from an identical formula, and that the plaintiff,
through no fault of her own, could not identify which manufacturer
had caused her injuries. 60 The court therefore held that proof of
causation would be satisfied by joinder of those defendants who had
together manufactured a substantial percentage of the DES which
plaintiffs mother might have taken. 6 1 The burden of proof would
then shift to each manufacturer to demonstrate that it could not
have made the particular drug which allegedly injured the
plaintiff. 62
The majority in Sindell also adopted a unique basis for
apportionment of damages. 63 The court held that damages were to
be apportioned among the manufacturers based upon each
defendant's probability of causation. 64 The likelihood that a
manufacturer might have been the actual cause-in-fact of the
plaintiff's alleged injuries was measured by the manufacturer's
percentage share of the relevant drug market. 65 Each defendantmanufacturer, therefore, became liable for the judgment in
proportion to its market share. 66 The court reasoned that,
"fuInder this approach, each manufacturer's liability would
approximate its responsibility for the injuries caused by its own
products. "67
held that, because it was apparent that at least one of the defendants was liable for the plaintiffs
injury, and because the defendants had engaged in conduct which placed legal obligations to the
plaintiffupon each of them, the burden of proof shifted to the defendants to prove their non-liability.
Id. at __ , 338 A.2d at 5.
60. 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. Each manufacturer's product was
made from the same formula and plaintiff's inability to identify the manufacturer who had produced
the injury-causing drug resulted primarily from the passage of time. Id.
61. Id. at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45. Under the Summers doctrine, the
probability that any one tortfeasor was the cause-in-fact of defendant's injury is measured by the
number of possible tortfeasors. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. The Sindell court
held, however, that in the "present context" the probability of causation was better measured by the
market share ofeach defendant. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The court did not
define what would constitute a "substantial share" of the relevant market. It implied, however, that
this figure is something less than seventy-five percent. Id.
62. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
63. Generally, damages are to be "apportioned among two or more causes when (a) there are
separate harms, or (b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a
single harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 433A (1965).
64. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. Because the court had established
fictional causation based upon the aggregate market shares of thejoined defendants, see supra note 61,
the court apportioned damages among them based upon each manufacturer's contribution to the
fictional causation. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
65. 26 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The relevant market was the
entire industry's production of DES for the purpose of preventing miscarriage. Id.
66. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
67. Id. The court explained the connection between percentage of market share and liability in
this way:
If X manufacturer sold one-fifth of
identification could be made in all
approximately one-fifth of all cases and
alternative liability, X would be joined

all the DES prescribed for pregnancy and
cases, X would be the sole defendant in
liable for all the damages in those cases. Under
in all cases in which identification could not be

CASE COMMENT

The court justified its extension of the Summers doctrine on
policy grounds. 68 One reason cited was that, as between an
innocent plaintiff and tortiously acting defendants, the latter should
bear the cost of injury. 6 9 The defendants had allegedly
manufactured a defective product, the effects of which were delayed
for several years, thereby creating the circumstances which
prevented the plaintiff from identifyinZ the precise product which
injured her.7 0
The Sindell court also recognized that traditional tort standards
are not always appropriate in the era of mass production and
complex marketing procedures. 7 1 Advancements in science and
technology create fungible goods which may harm consumers, and
which cannot be traced to any specific manufacturer. 7 2 In light of
this changing relationship between consumer plaintiffs and
manufacturer defendants, the court elected to create a new theory
of causation and liability which would more equitably govern the
73
obligations of manufacturers to consumers.
The court also noted the broad policy of allocating the risk of
harm to those who are in the best position to control the risks74 and
to absorb the costs of injury when harm actually occurs.7 5 The
court acknowledged the unfairness which might result if the actual
manufacturer is not among the joined defendants, but reasoned
that under the rule it had adopted each manufacturer's liability
would be approximately equivalent to the damages caused by the
made, but liable for only one-fifth of the total damages in these cases. X would pay the
same amount either way.
Id. at 612 n.28, 607 P.2d at 937 n.28, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145 n.28 (citing Fordham Comment, supra note
26, at 994).
68. 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. Requiring plaintiff to identify
the manufacturer which supplied the DES used by her mother or to join all DES manufacturers
would effectively preclude her recovery. Id.
69. Id. (citing Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948)).
70. 26 Cal. 3d at 611,607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
71. Id. at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (citing Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
24 Cal. 2d 453, 467, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1940) (Traynor, J., concurring) (the contemporary
complex industrialized society may necessitate adaptation of traditional tort principles)).
72. 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS 5 433B, comment h (1965) (modification of the Summers rule may be necessary if one of the
actors is not or cannot bejoined, or because of the effects of lapse of time or other circumstances)).
73. 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144 ("The response of the courts can
be either to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by such products, or to
fashion remedies to meet these changing needs. ").
74. Id. (citing Cronin v.J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 129, 501 P.2d 1153, 1159, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 439 (1972) (public policy requires that responsibility be fixed where it will most effectively
reduce "hazards to life and health")).
75. 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (citing Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring) ("the cost ofan injury and
the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless
one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a
cost of doing business")).
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DES it had in fact manufactured. 7 6 The joined defendants could
also file cross-complaints against DES manufacturers not joined in
the action and allege that they might have supplied the injurycausing product. 7
Although the Sindell decision can be described as a deliberate
policy decision seeking to compensate the plaintiff,18 it did not
impose liability on the manufacturers. The case was on appeal from
judgments granting the defendants' demurrers. 79 The plaintiff will
still have to prove at trial that the DES was the cause-in-fact of her
injuries80 and that the allegedly tortious manufacturing and
81
marketing of DES was the legal cause of her injuries.
Furthermore, any individual defendant will not be liable if it can
82
prove that its product could not have caused the plaintiff's injury.
76. 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146; see supra note 67. The court
acknowledged that a minor discrepancy in the correlation between market share and liability is
inevitable, but indicated that when a correct division of liability cannot be made "the trier of fact
may make it the best it can." 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The
discrepancy would develop when the joined defendants produced only a portion of the relevant
market, but would still be held liable for all of the plaintiff's damages. See id. at 617, 607 P.2d at 940,
163 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
77. 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. Allowing cross-complaints against
DES manufacturers not joined in the action would help correct the possible discrepancy in the
correlation between market share and liability. See supra note 76.
78. 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. After recognizing arguments
against allowing the plaintiff's claim, the Sindell court stated: "There are, however, forceful
arguments in favor of holding that plaintiffhas a cause of action." Id.
79. Id. at 596, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
80. The general rule is that in order for the plaintiff to recover in a products liability action he
must show that the product is defective, that the defect caused his injury, and that the defective
product is attributable to the party held responsible. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 5 16A(4), at 3B-88 (1980). The Sindell court, however, held only that plaintiff need not
establish the precise manufacturer of the injury-causing product. 26 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 607 P.2d at
937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
81. W. PROSSER, supra note 17, 5 42, at 244. The issue of proximate or legal causation may limit
liability even when the fact of causation is clearly established. Id. For a discussion of the various
causation issues involved in Sindell, see supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
The DES plaintiff faces a number of problems in establishing legal causation. First, the plaintiff
may not be able to utilize strict liability to hold the manufacturers liable. An exception to the
application of strict liability to drugs exists in cases in which the drugs are unavoidably unsafe, are
properly prepared and marketed, and are accompanied by proper warnings. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965). The duty to issue proper warnings is apparently
conditioned upon a seller's actual or constructive knowledge of the danger. Id. at comment
j; accord, Needham v. White Laboratories, Inc., 639 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1981) (manufacturer of
synthetic estrogen is subject to strict liability on the basis of failure to warn of a known or foreseeable
-, 92 Cal. Rptr. 825,
danger); Christofferson v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 15 Cal. App. 3d 67,
826 (1971) (scienter required before pharmaceutical manufacturer is under a duty to warn). But see
Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, 514 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. 1974) (Suit for wrongful death
resulting from addiction to a drug; court held that some drugs are so dangerous that the
manufacturer should be liable for harm caused by them even though the manufacturer did not know
of the dangers involved when the drug was marketed). See also Fordham Comment, supra note 26, at 971
n.25 (DES manufacturers may have been on notice of some of the carcinogenic properties of the drug
in early 1950s). Another obstacle which must be overcome in establishing legal causation is whether
the DES plaintiff's injuries were reasonably foreseeable when her mother ingested the drug.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers may not have been under a duty to test for second generation injuries
in 1947 when DES was originally marketed. Id.
82. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. Although the manufacturers do
not have knowledge superior to that of the plaintiff regarding causation, "they may in some instances
be able to prove they did not manufacture the injury-causing substance." Id. at 601-02, 607 P.2d at
930, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138.

CASE COMMENT

Thus, the Sindell court merely adopted a method of establishing
causation-in-fact not possible under traditional tort doctrines,
leaving to the defendants the task of resolving the question of
83
responsibility among themselves.
The significance of the Sindell decision lies in the court's
willingness to adopt a new basis for recovery in products liability
actions. 84 The Supreme Court of California has been a strong force
in the development of products liability law, and the decision may
signal a movement toward judicially created no-fault compensation
in products liability actions involving fungible products. 85 Three
points within the court's opinion indicate this possibility. First,
the court recognized that the pharmaceutical industry should bear
the loss, rather than the unfortunate consumer who fortuitously
incurred the injury.8 6 The court recognized that traditional
causation and liability rules are not always appropriate in this era
of mass production and complex marketing procedures. 8 7
Therefore, a new theory was adopted, allowing a plaintiff to
fictionally establish causation-in-fact by a named defendant.
Second, the burden placed upon the plaintiff to establish fictional
causation was minimal. The court required only that the plaintiff
join those manufacturers which together made up a "substantial
percentage" of the relevant enterprise. 88 Finally, the manner in
which damages were apportioned indicates the court's willingness
to adopt no-fault liability. Each defendant was proportionately
liable for the judgment based upon its status in the relevant
enterprise, and not upon its personal fault for the plaintiff's
injury. 8 9 The Sindell decision thus may be viewed not only as an
adaptation of the rules of causation and liability to our complex'
industrialized society, but may also be characterized as a purely
deliberate policy decision, necessary because of an apparent breach
83. Id. at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
84. Id. at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
85. "No-fault" is used here in the context of creating liability without establishment of
traditional causation-in-fact by a named defendant manufacturer. The plaintiff must still establish
causation by a particular defective fungible product and that each joined manufacturer has in fact
marketed that product. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
86. 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. The court also noted that
manufacturers "are better able to bear the cost of injury resulting from the manufacture of a
defective product." Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The court stated that the defendants must
represent a "substantial market share," but did not indicate what would be considered
"substantial." It implied, however, that it was something less than seventy-five percent. Id. The
court also did not define "market share." The majority described the practical problems involved in
defining the market and determining market share as "matters of proof." Id. at 613, 607 P.2d at
937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46.
89. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The court correlated causation and
liability to each manufacturer's share of the relevant market. Id. For a discussion of the court's
unique basis for apportioning damages, see supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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of a special responsibility undertaken by pharmaceutical
manufacturers in supplying medication to pregnant women. 90
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90. See W. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 39, at 223. Many products liability attorneys apparently
believe that the Sindell holding is applicable to products other than DES. The potential list of cases
could include litigation involving "chemical substances, agricultural products, and consumer items
- any case where there is a defective design that is followed by many companies in making an
identical product." Wall St.J., Dec. 30, 1980, at 1, col. 6.

